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OUTLINE
I. TAKINGS LAW AS WE’VE COME TO KNOW AND LOVE (HATE?) IT
The law of regulatory takings has evolved dramatically over the past 15-20 years. 
Generally speaking, legal principles in this area have become more complicated over 
that period, and somewhat more solicitous of the interests of private property owners. 
This has meant increased opportunities for the latter group, and correspondingly 
greater challenges for government regulators and environmentalists alike.
II. THE IMPACT OF LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
At least until 1992, the most important inverse condemnation precedent was the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York. 438 U.S. 104 (1977). Penn Central established a multifaceted balancing test by 
which courts could determine if a particular regulation went "too far," thereby triggering 
a compensable taking. Under the Penn Central test, government regulators prevailed 
in most cases.
In 1992, however, the Court decided Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.
505 U .S .__, 112 S.Ct. 2886. The Court held in Lucas that at least in those "relatively
rare" situations in which a regulation totally eliminates the economic value of private 
property, it would be presumed that an unconstitutional taking had occurred. This "per 
se" standard can be overcome, the Court ruled, only where: a) the proposed use of 
private property contravenes traditional notions and limitations based in state property 
law; or b) the regulation is necessary to forestall threats to the lives and property of 
others.
Like many of the Supreme Court’s recent inverse condemnation decisions, Lucas 
raises at least as many questions as it answers. Among those most relevant to the 
present discussion are: a) whether the regulatory takings principles applicable to real
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property are equally germane to other types of property interests, including water 
rights; and b) the scope of the two exceptions to the "per se" rule announced in Lucas. 
(On the latter point, Justice Scalia’s recent dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.__U .S .__ , 114 S.Ct. 1332 (1994) raises some
intriguing questions.)
III. LAND v. WATER (F EES v. USUFRUCTS)
One of the more interesting aspects of the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings 
jurisprudence is the fact that the Court has traditionally afforded private interests in 
real property greater protection under the Takings Clause than it has other types of 
private property rights. This trend was continued and, indeed, exacerbated in Lucas, 
which made the dichotomy explicit. The consequences of this distinction are especially 
significant when it comes to the interrelationship of inverse condemnation principles 
and water rights law. This is because of the usufructuary nature of water rights 
generally.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE & SIMILAR 
PRINCIPLES
Another key to government regulation of water rights vis-a-vis the Takings 
Clause is the first of the two exceptions to the Lucas "per se" rule. The inherent 
limitations imposed by state law on private water rights have always served as 
important constraints on the exercise of those rights. In some instances, those 
limitations are statutory in nature; in others, they are express or implied conditions on 
the water license or permit itself; in still others, longstanding common law principles 
such as the public trust doctrine are the basis of the limitations. These multifaceted 
constraints on the exercise of private water rights have traditionally limited the utility of 
regulatory takings principles as a shield by which private water users might fend off
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government regulation. Whether that trend will continue in the post-Lucas era is a 
key, unresolved issue.
V. THE BALKANIZATION OF APPLICABLE LEGAL PRECEPTS
The coming years will, in all likelihood, see a "balkanization" of regulatory 
takings law in jurisdictions around the nation. This balkanization can be expected to 
be especially prominent when it comes to inverse condemnation attacks on the 
regulation of private water rights.
A. WATER LAW-WHAT ELSE IS NEW?
The law of water rights has always diverged widely from state to state. Water 
law principles in the Western United States, for example, reflect precepts that are 
largely unknown to states east of the Mississippi River. Even among the Western 
states, water law principles vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. And perhaps that 
divergence is nowhere better illustrated than with respect to the clash between public 
and private rights to a given state’s finite water supply.
B. TAKINGS LAW-REVISITING OLD STATE PROPERTY LAW 
RULES
The Lucas decision exacerbates this trend by requiring courts to examine 
"background principles of the [particular] State’s law of property and nuisance" in 
adjudicating specific takings claims. It therefore becomes apparent that a regulation 
which triggers a compensable taking in State A may be wholly proper and 
constitutional in State B. This seems an odd state of affairs regarding what is, after all, 
an issue of federal constitutional law.
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C. SOME EXAMPLES FROM PARTICULAR STATES
The phenomenon can be illustrated by comparing the disparate water law 
systems currently existing in several Western states, and speculating on how a single, 
hypothetical regulatory restriction on private water rights might be viewed in response 
to a regulatory takings challenge brought in each of those jurisdictions. California and 
Colorado, for example, provide a study in marked contrasts.
VI. UPCOMING TAXINGS "HOT SPOTS" INVOLVING WATER RIGHTS
Regulatory takings challenges are being pursued with increasing frequency, and 
in an ever-expanding set of factual contexts. It is likely that more Takings Clause- 
based lawsuits will be brought to confront future attempts by government to control or 
limit the exercise of private water rights. Within that context, certain legal and factual 
contexts seem especially fraught with controversy and uncertainty. These include the 
intersection between water rights, on the one hand, and: a) state and federal 
endangered species laws; b) government efforts to preserve and restore wetlands; and 
c) federal and state efforts to enact legislative restrictions on previously-settled and 
contractually-based water rights.
An example of the third type of conflict is discussed in part (VII), below:
VII. FEDERAL WATER CONTRACTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: LESSONS 
FROM CALIFORNIA’S CENTRAL VALLEY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
In the past decade, and in response to diverse pressures, Congress has enacted a 
series of statutes dramatically affecting contractual rights of agribusiness to water 
furnished by the federal government through the Central Valley Project (CVP) in 
California. Each of these statutes (as well as executive branch efforts to implement
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them) has been met with litigation in federal court raising constitutional objections to 
the Congressional "reform" efforts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
has issued important decisions in the first two phases of this litigation, and a third, 
related lawsuit is currently pending and almost certain to be appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit eventually.
These cases provide important clues as to how courts are likely to rule on 
future, constitutionally-based challenges to federal efforts to alter water rights previously 
granted under federal law.
A. ACT I: PETERSON v. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR. 899 F.2d 799 
(9th Cir. 1990)("hammer clause" contained in Reclamation Reform Act of 
1982 withstands both inverse condemnation and due process challenges).
B. ACT II: MADERA IRRIGATION DIST. v. HANCOCK. 985 F.2d 1397 
(9th Cir. 1993) (government’s conditioning renewal of CVP water 
contracts on payment of funds for operation and maintenance costs 
attributable to original contract terms does not violate constitutional rights 
of water user under federal contract).
C. ACT III: WESTLANDS WATER DIST. v. U.S.A. _  F.Supp. _ ,  1994 
WL 99171 (E.D.Cal. March 3, 1994) (attacks on the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s efforts to implement the 1993 Central Valley Project 
Improvement Act).
VIII.CAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT "TAKE" STATE-ISSUED WATER
RIGHTS?
A distinct question is whether the United States, acting in its police power or 
sovereign capacity, can act in a manner which triggers a compensable taking of private
6
water rights granted under state--as opposed to federal--law. Little case law speaks 
directly to this issue. However, a handful of recent decisions suggest a likely direction, 
and one can predict at least a couple of contexts in which the issue will be squarely 
raised.
A. HINTS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims recently issued two decisions which touch on, 
but do not squarely address, this issue. The cases are Broughton Lumber Co. v.
United States. 30 Cl.Ct. 234 (1994), and Fallini v. United States.__Cl.Ct.__ , 1994
U.S. Claims LEXIS 64 (1994).
B. THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED UNDER 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT-THE SAGA OF THE SNAKE 
RIVER SALMON
One of the most controversial and potentially-sweeping applications of the 
federal Endangered Species Act involves a complex system of federal water projects in 
the Pacific Northwest and the countless private parties who depend on that system for 
their water and power supplies. The dramatically-declining Chinook and sockeye 
salmon runs in the Columbia/Snake River system have precipitated ESA-based 
demands that the complex system of federal dams and related improvements on those 
waterways be operated in a fundamentally different, more environmentally-benign 
manner. Such reforms, if carried out, would inevitably reduce the water supplies 
available to at least some categories of users who rely on that system. Those 
reductions, in turn, will likely produce constitutionally-based challenges to the federal 
government’s power to implement such reforms without compensating those interests 
who would be prejudiced as a result.
7
C. REASSERTING FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS -- A PHOENIX 
RISING FROM THE ASHES. OR BANQUO’S GHOST?
The Clinton Administration has announced that it may formally reconsider the 
decade-old policy of the Reagan and Bush Administrations not to assert federal 
reserved water rights for Congressionally-created wilderness areas. Secretary of the 
Interior Bruce Babbitt has promised a final decision by the end of the calendar year. 
Environmentalists, Native Americans, recreationists and other interest groups are urging 
the Clinton Administration to vigorously assert these federal reserved water rights. 
Private property owners and several Western states are just as adamantly opposed to 
any such shift in federal policy. Regardless of one’s views on the subject, one thing 
can be predicted with certainty: if the Clinton Administration does formally reassert 
federal reserved water rights appurtenant to federal wilderness areas, an inevitable 
response will be claims that this policy shift represents an unconstitutional taking of 
private property (i.e., competing private, state-issued water rights), for which 
compensation is required from the United States.
IX. CONCLUSION
The intersection of water law and the Takings Clause presents unique factual 
and legal disputes. Pressed by a variety of legal and policy mandates, government 
regulators will doubtless continue to assert public rights to water claimed by private 
parties as their own. Those private parties can be expected in many instances to 
respond by relying on the Takings Clause and related constitutional principles to 
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